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Liberal multiculturalism
A defence of liberal multicultural measures without
minority rights
PATRICK LOOBUYCK
Ghent University, Belgium
INTRODUCTION
In this article, I will introduce and discuss the possibility and desirability of
‘multicultural measures’ – specific group-based measures intended to
benefit ethnic, religious or cultural minority groups. Unlike many multi-
culturalists, I reject the notion of specific permanent measures based on
minority rights granted to (members of) groups solely for the protection of
their shared culture. On the other hand, I do support special treatment of
some cultural or ethnic minorities under exceptional circumstances. But,
the differential treatment must not be an acknowledgement of special
minority rights. It has to be the result of the practical application of gener-
ally acknowledged, liberal and valid citizenship rights. I consider here only
the question of rights for ethnocultural minorities in immigration societies.
I will not discuss the justification of self-government rights for aboriginal,
indigenous groups or national minorities (cf. Kymlicka, 1995: 27–30).
LIBERAL MULTICULTURALISM: A CONTRADICTION?
Most countries today are multicultural societies, but not all of them are
multiculturalist. ‘Multicultural’ refers to the empirical fact of diversity,
‘multiculturalism’ to a normative response to that fact. Multiculturalism is
a policy based on a philosophy of saying ‘yes’ to the fact of diversity (Raz,
1994: 173).
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Since the end of the 1980s, multiculturalism has been a major theme in
political philosophy. Kymlicka (2001: 39ff.) has suggested that there is a
growing consensus that multiculturalism is the way of thinking about our
political societies. However, multiculturalism is an umbrella that covers
many different ideas, and there is no consensus among political philos-
ophers about the meaning of the term. The common denominator that
binds different multiculturalists is unease about the way mainstream liberal
thinking treats the issues of diversity and pluralism. In particular, the
impartial neutrality of liberal policy has become the target of a number of
multicultural thinkers. This is not to suggest that liberal impartiality is not
a good cause, but ‘difference-blind liberalism’ is accused of failing to live
up to its own egalitarian ideals.
Some critics of traditional liberalism are mild, while others are harsh.
According to some, liberalism should refine itself from within (cf. Kymlicka,
Tamir, Raz, Carens). But, according to others, we have to go ‘beyond
liberalism’ (Parekh, 2000: 109–13, 172; Taylor, 1992). Taylor complains that
the egalitarian liberal position is ‘inhospitable to difference’, and Young
writes that the liberal principles of equal treatment are bound up with ‘the
ideal of assimilation’. The charge is that the (implicit) aim of liberalism is
to exclude or homogenize difference (Taylor, 1992: 43; Tully, 1995: 58–62;
Young, 1990: 158). Moreover, in the eyes of the adepts in the politics of
difference, people do not simply demand equal treatment, but more import-
antly, ‘recognition’ of their distinct identities as members of particular
cultural communities. The liberal civil rights are said to pay insufficient
attention to the latter (Taylor, 1992: 41; Tully, 1995: 190; Young, 1990: 161).
On the other hand, the multiculturalists have also been seriously
criticized by their (liberal) opponents. In Culture and Equality Brian Barry
accuses them of being anti-universalistic and anti-liberal, and thus of
denying the ideals of the Enlightenment. Multiculturalists are said to
unjustly support the politicization of cultural group identities, thereby
paradoxically, obstructing the integration of minorities (Barry, 2001: 5).
They do this in the name of ‘minority rights’ – rights which are claimed
solely on the basis of membership of a particular cultural group and which
have the purpose of perpetuating and protecting the cultural identity –
which can find no place in liberalism.
Liberals such as Barry are not against pluralism and cultural diversity
within a particular political society, but they maintain that liberalism offers
sufficient intrinsic possibilities to accommodate diversity in a fair way.
Liberalism does not need extra (minority) rights and extra measures above
and beyond liberal rights and measures. In other words: Barry is not against
multicultural measures, as long as they are liberal. But he would prefer to
speak about liberal instead of multicultural measures.
Thus, Barry and many multiculturalists define multiculturalism in a very
specific way: multiculturalism is that which transcends liberalism to
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accommodate cultural and religious diversity. As the title of this article
already suggests, I will not use this narrow definition – otherwise ‘liberal
multiculturalism’ would be a contradictio in terminis. By multiculturalism I
mean a policy within the scope of liberal philosophy that seeks maximum
accommodation of differences in religious, cultural or ethnic origin in a
stable and morally defensible way, in private as well as in public spheres. I
think that for the task to accommodate differences, liberalism still has
enough potency, and that when there is a conflict between liberalism and
diversity, the principles of liberalism have priority. Many critics of liberal-
ism seem to forget that liberalism is in fact a theory of pluralism. And in as
far as multiculturalism is a species of pluralism, liberalism is ‘fundamentally
a theory of multiculturalism’ too (cf. Kukathas, 1998: 690). Liberalism is
indeed the response of the modern world to the fact of moral, religious, and
cultural diversity. Liberalism says that, within some margins, differences
should be tolerated and accommodated. This is what Rawls meant by the
priority of the right over the ideas of the good (Rawls, 1971: 28, 1988).
Liberalism also admits that a complete social unity, marked by uniform and
common culture that integrates and harmonizes the interests of individual
and community, is unattainable and undesirable. So, along with Kukathas,
I assert that liberalism does not have a problem with multiculturalism, and
thus my concepts of ‘liberal multiculturalism’ or ‘multicultural liberalism’
(I will use both) are unequivocal in my interpretation.
This must show that the radical critics of liberalism are not fair because
they do not appear to realize that egalitarian liberalism is essentially a
fair basis for pluralism. Liberalism actually gives a basis for a multi-
cultural theory based on the central concepts of tolerance, freedom, and
equality. If, on the contrary, there were to be a hidden agenda aimed
towards the elimination of difference, as Young and Tully suggest, then
liberalism would not be worth its name. Egalitarian liberalism is not the
enemy of diversity; rather it is the foundation upon which pluralism in
the areas of culture, religion, and lifestyle can fairly be implemented in a
single society.
The criticism that liberalism pays insufficient attention to the individu-
ality of personality, identity, and culture, is also puzzling. It is, after all,
the intention of liberalism to ensure that all people are treated equally,
regardless of their differences. It is the strength, not a weakness, of liberal-
ism that it forms the ‘politics of indifference’ on these issues (Kukathas,
1998: 691; Barry, 2001: 274ff.). However, unlike the suggestion of Taylor
and Young, liberalism cannot extend to compulsory recognition of
differences.
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THE PRACTICE VERSUS THE IDEALS OF LIBERALISM
But it is clear that not all interpretations and concretizations of liberalism
are versions of ‘multicultural liberalism’. In practice, liberalism does not
make full use of its multicultural potential. Barry (2001: 317) writes that
many problems are ‘invented out of nothing by multiculturalists’. There is
some truth in this, but in part, he is too optimistic, as if liberalism can no
longer be improved, for instance concerning the concrete application in
novel circumstances. In practice some mainstream interpretations of
liberalism are indeed not maximally hospitable to difference. On this point
some critics of multiculturalists are justified. Some of them diagnose
rightly the case. However, they provide the wrong remedies by going
beyond liberalism, when the remedies can also be found within liberalism
itself.
Thus, it is undeniable that liberal governments are in practice less neutral
than they would wish themselves to be. Nobody can neglect the fact that
every political culture is a product of its particular history. The official
language, symbols of state, official holidays, etc.; they are all the non-
neutral results of a historical process.
This problem must be addressed from within liberalism itself, because
the practical situation does not live up to liberal ideals. It follows that an
ideal of neutral politics as ‘benign neglect’ is untenable, not in the least
because of liberalism’s own aims and principles. This kind of passive and
strict neutrality appears to be a system that is heavily weighted in favour of
the majority group (cf. Kymlicka, 2001: 43; Tamir, 1993; Taylor, 1992: 62).
Therefore it should be better that the passive hands-off neutrality – neither
hindering nor helping any particular (ethno) cultural group – is replaced
within the scope of egalitarian liberalism by the idea and practice of neutral-
ity and justice as even-handedness (Carens, 2000).
Thus liberalism that wants to live up to its own ideals of pluralism and
equality cannot translate itself into practice as a passive hands-off
approach, because this approach does not offer satisfactory accommo-
dation for national, religious, cultural, and ethnic differences. Passive
laissez-faire neutrality is not always the best way to realize equal treat-
ment of different members of different groups. Government should not
always take up a passive neutral position. In different domains, it may
adopt accommodating policies such as offering religious subjects in public
education, and the public funding of recognized religions (Barry, 2001:
29).
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MULTICULTURAL AMENDMENTS TO THE IDEALS OF
LIBERALISM
There can also be tension between the ideals of a mainstream interpretation
of liberalism and a multicultural interpretation of liberalism that seeks to
accommodate cultural and religious diversity as much as possible, within
the boundaries of liberalism itself.
A mainstream interpretation of liberalism implies that the neutrality of
liberal policy also means that the public sphere must be as neutral as
possible. This is one interpretation of liberalism, but not a multicultural
one. This is because a liberalism that strives towards a neutral public sphere
leaves less scope for diversity than the liberalism that strives towards a
pluralistic public sphere and demands neutrality only where that is essen-
tial. The French idea of ‘laïcité’ and ‘radical secularism’ is a good example
of a non-multicultural interpretation of liberalism.1
But the link between liberal neutrality and a strictly neutral public
sphere is not necessary at all. Within liberalism the ideal of a neutral public
sphere can be replaced by the idea of a pluralistic one. It is possible to think
of a liberal public sphere in terms of pluralism because we can discard the
idea that the public sphere has to be neutral to be impartial. Pluralism can
be allowed as long as it threatens no danger to the public or to the indi-
viduals concerned, and as long as it does not interfere with the effective
functioning of the social practice under consideration or the liberal state
(cf. Barry, 2001: 54–62). Neutrality in the public sphere is only appropriate
when it is functionally necessary, such as in courts of justice and police
work, or when public law and order is threatened. Thus liberal multi-
culturalism acknowledges that neither a neutral nor a monocultural public
space is the aim of policy. For the public sphere the motto should be: plural-
ism where possible, neutrality when necessary.
There is also a second amendment to mainstream liberalism that I want
to mention here. Within liberalism, it is possible to treat the access to one’s
own culture and cultural membership as primary social goods. Liberalism
has long ignored the fact that culture is an element which should be
included in considerations of justice. In this I agree with the well-known
opinions of Raz (1994) and Kymlicka (1989: ch.8, 1995: ch. 5). People can
only regard themselves as autonomous beings when they have access to a
societal culture of choice. Group-differentiated measures that secure and
promote this access may therefore have a legitimate role to play in a liberal
theory of justice (Kymlicka, 1995: 83–4; Tamir, 1993: ch. 1–2). When
members of minorities face disadvantages with respect to the good of
cultural membership, those disadvantages may require rectification by
special group-based measures. As we will see, this does not imply the use
of minority or group rights.
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In fact, with liberal multiculturalism, I propose a third way between anti-
liberal multiculturalism and radical anti-multicultural liberalism. On the
one hand, I agree that ‘liberalism is itself, fundamentally, a theory of multi-
culturalism’. In no way do we have to abandon liberalism in order to
address multiculturalism. On the other hand, some multicultural charges
against liberalism do have justification. Some interpretations and historical
manifestations of liberalism have given only limited hospitality to differ-
ence and pluralism within the bounds of liberalism. The practical appli-
cation of the abstract and formal liberal rights requires special attention for
the context and the specific interests of the people who are concerned;
otherwise the result may be to foster unfair inequality instead of equality
(cf. McLachlin, 2003).
To illustrate this position, I will introduce and discuss the concept of
liberal multicultural measures without minority rights.
BEYOND THE CONTROVERSY ABOUT MINORIT Y RIGHTS
One of the main topics that divides philosophers, political and legal
theorists into multiculturalists and opponents of multiculturalism is the
question: do we need minority rights? (cf. Räikkä, 1996) The disagreement
is not equivalent to the contrast between liberalism and communitarianism,
since Kymlicka, a liberal political theorist, gives the most extensive defence
of minority rights. He and many others argue that the so-called colour-blind
approach of traditional liberalism must be complemented with the
acknowledgement of minority rights – ‘special legal or constitutional
measures, above and beyond the common rights of citizenship’2 – to defend
the culture, religion or identity of a minority group. Minority rights should
protect cultural differences that might be lost if a colour-blind policy of
benign neglect were to be applied.
However, Barry argues that liberal egalitarianism cannot make way for
such minority rights advocated by the theorists of multiculturalism. ‘For
what they propose are group-based policies deliberately intended to
perpetuate cultural differences indefinitely. Moreover, they do not make
claims for the justice of such policies on the ground that they are needed to
redress inequality of opportunity’ (Barry, 2001: 117).
In order to progress beyond the discussion between Barry and Kymlicka,
I propose to introduce the concept of ‘multicultural measures’. By a multi-
cultural measure, I mean an exceptional, temporary measure directed
towards a specific cultural, ethnic or religious group in order to give more
substance to the concept of equal opportunity. So, the different treatment
is not the consequence of the acknowledgement of ‘special’ minority rights
– ‘above and beyond the common rights of citizenship’ – but the result of
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the practical application of generally acknowledged individual and liberal
citizenship rights (e.g. freedom of religion, right to education, right to work,
etc.). For impartial liberalism can make way for a different approach for
some groups, if this approach is based on the idea that equal opportunities
can only be guaranteed by acting differently towards different groups.
Unlike minority rights, a multicultural measure is not permanent. The
special treatment of certain (cultural minority) groups may only serve to
neutralize an unfair inequality: discrimination in the labour market,
obstructive mechanisms in education, but also inequality regarding access
to and experience of the own culture.
To treat the access to one’s own culture and cultural membership as
primary social goods (see earlier) does not mean, however, that all kinds of
specific measures should be introduced to guarantee that people can
practise their religion and culture ‘in equality’ and/or ‘in full’. First, all its
members must voluntarily accept the culture in question, and there must
also be sufficient exit options. A liberal government should try to discour-
age or even forbid illiberal cultural elements. In such an event, other human
rights take precedence over religious and cultural rights. Second, there
should be recognition of a ‘sufficiency principle’, which requires govern-
ments to ensure that people can practise their culture at a ‘minimum accept-
able’ level. As long as cultural experience remains below the minimum
acceptable level, governments should intervene with special support
measures. But once above the minimum acceptable level, governments
should take no further action, even though people may still encounter
substantial differences in their opportunities to practise their own culture.
AMBIGUIT Y IN KYMLICKA’S LIBERAL ARGUMENTATION
FOR POLYETHNIC MINORIT Y RIGHTS
This concept of liberal multicultural measures overlaps with most of
Kymlicka’s polyethnic rights and special representation rights. But I try to
argue in such a way that Barry’s criticism of Kymlicka’s minority rights is
negated. Critics can remark that the argument of this article cannot be a
genuine alternative to Kymlicka’s theory of multiculturalism. They are
right. I do not claim to provide a general alternative, especially because I
do not enter the crucial discussion about self-government rights for national
minorities. I only want to consider here the discussion about the minority
rights for ethnic minorities. And even on that point our argument is rather
a reformulation than a real alternative of Kymlicka’s idea of polyethnic
rights.
Because Kymlicka is a liberal political philosopher, he has argued his
polyethnic minority rights in such a fashion that they are not in conflict with
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egalitarian liberal philosophy. First, he makes it clear that external protec-
tions may never be used to permit cultural groups to frustrate the funda-
mental rights and freedoms of their members (Kymlicka, 1995: 34–44,
152–72). Polyethnic rights want to protect specific religious and cultural
practices which are disadvantaged or which might not be adequately
supported by existing legislation, but have to reject internal restrictions.
Polyethnic immigration policies are intended to enable immigrants to
express their ethnic identity, and to reduce some of the external pressures
on them to assimilate. But along with Kymlicka, it is perfectly logical (and
liberal) to accept that aim, while denying that groups are entitled to
regulate individuals’ freedom and to impose practices on members who do
not wish to maintain them.
Second, Kymlicka is justifiably reluctant to use the term ‘collective
rights’, because the individual is the only recognized bearer of moral and
political rights in liberal thinking. Since groups cannot be rights bearers, he
prefers to use the expression ‘group differentiated’ or ‘minority rights’
(Kymlicka, 1989: 138–40, 1995: 45–48, 2001: 71–82). As a liberal, Kymlicka
remains an individualist: the individual is morally prior to the community,
and the community matters only because it contributes to the well-being of
the individuals who compose it. But moreover, he argues, most group-
differentiated rights are not about the primacy of communities over indi-
viduals. Rather, they are based upon the idea that justice between groups
requires that the members of different groups be accorded different rights.
For Kymlicka, group-differentiated citizenship is thus a matter of justice
between members of different groups. Third, Kymlicka makes a qualitative
distinction between three forms of group-specific rights: self-government
rights for national minorities or indigenous peoples, polyethnic rights for
immigrant groups and special representation rights. Immigrants have fewer
rights than national minorities (Kymlicka, 1995: 26ff.).3 Moreover, unlike
self-government rights, polyethnic rights are intended to promote inte-
gration into a larger society, not self-government.
With these arguments, Kymlicka goes a long way towards disarming
classical liberal criticisms of minority rights. Yet, Kymlicka’s terminology
continues to cause confusion. Terms such as ‘group-differentiated citizen-
ship’, ‘polyethnic rights’, and ‘rights above and beyond the common rights
of citizenship’ irritate egalitarian liberals as a red rag irritates a bull,
because these terms give the impression that multiculturalism has to go
beyond liberalism.
Kymlicka is also ambiguous on the purpose of polyethnic minority rights.
On the one hand, he writes that he will only endorse special rights for ethnic
minorities if there actually is a disadvantage with respect to cultural
membership (Kymlicka: 1989: ch. 9, 1995: 109ff.). On the other hand, he
argues that minority rights are ‘not seen as temporary’ because the cultural
differences they protect are not something we seek to eliminate (Kymlicka,
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1995: 31). Kymlicka is not clear whether his minority rights serve to protect
a cultural identity as an end in itself, or whether they are intended to negate
an inequality and are merely means in order to achieve more general and
justice-based goals, such as equal opportunities and equal freedom (e.g. the
freedom of religious practice). In this fashion, Kymlicka and many other
multiculturalists with him, leave themselves vulnerable to Barry’s criticism.
LIBERAL AND TEMPORARY ‘MULTICULTURAL MEASURES’
INSTEAD OF MINORIT Y RIGHTS
Egalitarian conditions for group-differentiated measures
I propose to resolve those shortcomings by talking only in terms of ‘multi-
cultural measures’ instead of special (polyethnic, minority) rights. The
multicultural group-specific measures are always legitimized by the
common rights of citizenship, not by ‘special’ minority rights. We should
think in terms of equal citizenship, instead of Young’s differentiated citizen-
ship. Application of the common rights of citizenship can require group-
differentiated measures under particular circumstances, as all liberals will
agree. Special treatments for the members of certain groups are not necess-
arily contrary to basic liberal principles.
Also Barry writes explicitly that his egalitarian liberalism does not rule
out group-based policies (Barry, 2001: 12–3, 113ff.). The individualistic
nature of liberalism does not preclude policies that provide special benefits
for people based on their membership of particular groups. Egalitarian
liberalism takes the view that any disadvantage for which the victim is not
responsible establishes a prima facie claim to compensation. On this basis,
egalitarian liberal principles should provide no objection to special
measures for providing assistance for members of disadvantaged groups
(Barry, 2001: 114; Dworkin, 1981).
Group-differentiated measures must, according to egalitarian liberals,
comply with well-defined conditions. The beneficiaries of the special treat-
ment are assumed to be people who want the same things as the rest of the
population and simply lack the resources that would enable them to enjoy
more of those things. Moreover, the special measures are needed to redress
inequality of opportunity or resources, and as such the special measures
have to be temporary, because the measures tend to decrease diversity and
social isolation.
Barry acknowledges that ‘there may be cases in which a system of group-
based rights for those suffering from systematic disadvantage will be a way
of helping to meet the egalitarian liberal demand that people should not
have fewer resources and opportunities than others when this inequality has
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arisen out of circumstances that they had no responsibility for bringing
about’ (Barry, 2001: 13). But, he argues, the multiculturalists’ argument for
cultural based rights does not depend on this kind of inequality because,
according to multiculturalists, the special minority rights are granted to
groups defined by their distinctive cultural attributes, and these special
rights will be needed permanently – or at any rate as long as the group
retains its cultural distinctiveness. Moreover, he writes, ‘if the group did no
longer need special rights, that would not be regarded as a cause for
celebration, because it would be taken to suggest that the support for the
group’s culture had been insufficient to prevent its members from assimi-
lating to that of some larger or more powerful group’ (Barry, 2001: 13).
Multicultural measures as liberal measures
In the following discussion, I will show that the concept of multicultural
measures is a liberal one because it complies with the conditions that Barry
and other egalitarian liberals stipulate for the special treatment of groups.
However, various elements that I propose can also be found in the work of
Kymlicka (not without reason a ‘liberal’ political philosopher), with the
difference that I have applied modified terminology and have adjusted
certain arguments in order to disarm the criticism of liberals such as Barry.
I hope that (our argument for) the concept of multicultural measures is
clearer on those points than Kymlicka’s argument for minority rights, which
remains rather ambiguous.
In the first place, multicultural measures should be recognizable as
liberal measures that everyone would support, regardless of their individual
identity and view of the good life. They concern the application of a
universal primary social good. Thus Barry does not have a problem with,
for instance, affirmative action in relation to jobs or special funding for
education to help minority groups whose members suffer systematic
disadvantage, when ‘disadvantage’ is defined in universal terms such as the
lack of things (resources and opportunities) whose possession would gener-
ally be agreed to be advantageous.
But, contrary to Barry’s opinions, it is difficult to deny that access to the
own ‘societal culture as context of choice’ is also a primary good – i.e. ‘a
good which people need, regardless of their particular chosen way of life,
since it provides a context within which they make those particular choices’
(Kymlicka, 1995: 214; cf. earlier). Whenever access to the culture of choice
is unreasonably obstructed by arbitrary historical circumstances, multi-
cultural measures can justifiably be used to redress the balance.
Second, it must continually be emphasized that multicultural measures
are only necessary if the measures actually serve to rectify an unchosen,
unfair disadvantage and inequality. The special treatment must be the result
of specific application of a universal and individual right that would
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otherwise have been denied.4 It has nothing to do with minority or group
rights which are aimed towards recognition, protection, and perpetuation
of cultures and group identities for their own sake. Like Barry’s group-
differentiated measures, these multicultural measures are not designed to
reinforce differences, but to promote inclusion and enable integration of
the beneficiaries. Differential treatment of cultural groups can, under well-
defined circumstances, be a way to achieve a desirable level of equality
(Miller, 2002; Kymlicka, 1995: 114ff.). In this context, multicultural
measures should always be temporary – as long as the unfair inequality
persists. Once the inequality ends, or is no longer unfair, there is no longer
any valid reason to give the group special treatment.
However, Kymlicka (1995: 176ff.) emphasizes that the philosophy under-
lying polyethnic rights is an ‘integrationist one’, and he can not exclude that
the demands of some groups for permanent polyethnic rights will take the
form of withdrawal from the larger society. We can think of the example of
Roma or Muslim groups who have demanded the same sort of exemption
from a liberal education granted to the Amish in the USA. The only thing
that Kymlicka writes is that these kind of demands are ‘atypical’ and that
they have not been accepted in Canada, the USA or Australia, but he gives
no philosophical argument why they cannot be accepted. On this point
Kymlicka is not clear enough. As we have already seen, the same problem
of ambiguity arises about the purpose and temporality of his polyethnic
minority rights.
For Barry it is clear, special group-differentiated measures are always
temporary, because special treatment is justifiable only for as long as the
unfair inequality persists. For that reason, members of a cultural group can
never be entitled to continue special rights after resources and oppor-
tunities have been equalized.
The multicultural measures that I propose in this article are equally clear
in purpose: they serve to increase social integration and eliminate unfair
inequalities and are therefore, at least in principle, temporary. The differ-
ence with Barry is that I also regard unequal access to the preferred culture
of choice as a relevant inequality of resources and opportunity. Barry
denies this.
SOME EXAMPLES OF MULTICULTURAL MEASURES
An example of a multicultural measure such as described above is the direc-
tive issued by the Flemish Minister of Education (16 august 2002), which
determines that children are authorized to be absent from school for ‘the
celebration of holy days which are inherent to the constitutionally recog-
nized religion of a pupil’.5
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This measure was criticized because it awarded group rights solely based
on membership of a particular religion. However, it is easy to disarm this
criticism. This measure is not applied on the basis of membership of a
particular group, but on the basis of the general right to religious
observance.6 We can imagine that based on Rawls’s original position, a
choice could be made to spread public holidays in such a fashion that the
various religions would benefit. However, the legally fixed public holidays
are based only on the Catholic calendar. The relevant minorities were not
present during the historical period when the holidays were fixed. They
entered the game after it had already begun.
If the right to religious freedom is to be actively implemented, then
government must create a framework that will provide people a minimum
acceptable level of freedom to observe their religion. The provision of that
same right to different religions can require the application of differentiated
measures. Since celebration of certain religious holy days lies at the core of
religious life, we can assume that anyone unable to take time off work or
school for these holidays will fall below the acceptable minimum level of
religious experience. Based on the stated ‘sufficiency standard’, it is there-
fore legitimate for governments to take special measures to permit people
a minimum level of religious observance. The ministerial directive fulfils
this need. Reference to the sufficiency standard also makes clear why the
directive does not provide authorization for children to be absent from
school for longer periods in order to make a pilgrimage to Mecca, even
though such a pilgrimage is deeply important to Muslims. There are more
than enough opportunities during the extensive school vacations for such a
pilgrimage, and therefore a minimum level of religious freedom on this
point is guaranteed.
Opponents of the ministerial directive also refer to the hazard of the
slippery slope. What if, after a while, certain groups request reduced school
attendance because education is not appropriate to their culture, and what
about the children who are kept away from school to travel with their
parents outside the regular school vacations? Regarding the latter, we can
be brief: the decision to travel is a choice, and as such is of a different order
than the circumstances of rightful membership of a religious group.
Membership of a certain religion is not a choice (Jones, 1994). Inequalities
that fall outside of individual responsibilities should be eliminated as far as
possible under egalitarian liberalism (Dworkin, 1981; Kymlicka, 1989;
Rawls, 1971: 96).
The proposed measure does not open the door to a regulation such as
that existing in the United Kingdom, and which is defended by Kukathas
(1995: 248): Roma are only required to send their children to school for half
the normal duration (and because of the lack of control, this de facto
amounts to no school attendance at all). However, the desire for holidays
on a few specific days, as allowed by the Flemish ministerial directive, is not
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motivated by a wish to reduce school attendance for cultural reasons. It is
the result of a desire to give equal opportunities for the celebration of
religious holy days. Furthermore, this measure is also temporary, in the
sense that it could be repealed if it became redundant, for instance follow-
ing a fundamental rearrangement of the school year. It is possible that the
measure will be ‘de facto’ a permanent measure because such a rearrange-
ment will never occur, but in principle it is a temporary one. The measure
is not an end in itself, but is only necessary as long as the unfair inequality
with other acknowledged religions persists. Once the inequality ends, or is
no longer unfair, there is no longer any valid reason to give the children of
the religions that are mentioned in the directive a special treatment.
In fact, the ministerial directive is an example of the application of the
controversial rule-and-exemption approach. There are also other situations
in which the rule-and-exemption approach can be applied as a multicultural
measure. There are for instance schools that maintain rules regarding
school uniforms yet permit Muslim girls to deviate from the rules by
wearing headscarves (cf. Barry, 2001: 49ff.). Another classic example is that
of the turban-wearing Sikhs, who in many countries are relieved of the obli-
gation to wear motorcycle crash helmets or building site hard hats. The
application of the rule-and-exemption approach must be considered in
context but, all things considered, it will usually be found better to enforce
the rules for everybody, or to relax the rules for everybody. ‘Usually,
though, either the case for the law (or some version of it) is strong enough
to rule out exemptions, or the case that can made for exemptions is strong
enough to suggest that there should be no law anyway’ (Barry, 2001: 39).
An example of the latter is the decree introduced in Flanders to allow
human burial in other coverings than the traditional coffin. This law change
arises from the desire of Muslims not to bury their dead in coffins. Instead
of allowing exemptions to the law, it was decided to change the law itself.
In the case of ritual animal slaughter in Flanders, neither law change nor
the rule-and-exemption approach has been used. Yet the government has
still taken a multicultural measure: local authorities are encouraged to
arrange for temporary slaughter floors alongside the recognized abattoirs,
where it will be possible to slaughter animals in a humane and environ-
mentally friendly fashion, with respect for Muslim traditions.
Many other multicultural measures can be considered in the same light,
but without using the rule-and-exemption approach. We might consider
special subsidies for schools serving high concentrations of minorities,
positive action in the labour market (quotas, special training courses)
directed towards immigrants, free language tuition for newcomers, etc.
They should always be temporary measures based on universally applicable
individual rights that are designed to counter unfair inequalities. The
politics of affirmative action or positive discrimination is legitimized when
it temporarily gives preferential treatment to disadvantaged groups, with
ETHNICITIES 5(1)120
121
the aim of eventually removing disadvantages and achieving a situation of
equality.
Finally, let me cite one more example concerning multinational multi-
culturalism in Belgium. There are special measures implemented by
Brussels or local authorities around the language border in order to guaran-
tee bilingual access to schooling and social services, which can be regarded
as multicultural measures. However, such measures can only be justified
when required to provide Flemish and French speakers with access to
essential services such as education and medical care in their native
language, but not to protect the language as such (as in Quebec). The legit-
imacy of such measures ceases as soon as the injustice has been removed,
which – bearing in mind the sufficiency norm – requires access to an
adequate number of schools and hospitals, not necessarily an equal number
of Flemish- and French-speaking facilities. Again, in principle these
measures are temporary, and are only valid as long as the unfair inequality
persists, but in practice they often assume a permanent character.
CONCLUSION
In this article, the concept of a ‘liberal multicultural measure’ has been
developed and illustrated. Despite the substantial parallels with Kymlicka’s
minority rights, I have emphasized a number of aspects whereby multi-
cultural measures should become acceptable for those egalitarian liberals
who distrust minority rights in the form advocated by the majority of multi-
cultural theorists. My plea for these multicultural measures shows that the
egalitarian liberal perspective has more multicultural potential than is
generally acknowledged.
Notes
1 For a discussion of the difference between radical, ideological secularism on the
one hand, and moderate, pragmatic secularism on the other hand, see Modood,
1998: 390ff.
2 The quote is from Kymlicka, 1995: 26.
3 The distinction used by Kymlicka between national minorities and immigrant
groups, and the resultant hierarchy of minority rights, is hard to defend. National
minorities would have more rights (i.e. self-government rights and the right to
re-create their own societal cultures) than immigrant groups, since the latter (as
distinct from refugees) have voluntarily left their homeland. When people
choose to leave their own culture, they know that their success will depend on
integrating into the new society. This gives rise to two problems. In our world,
the line between involuntary refugees and voluntary immigrants is difficult to
draw. Many people leave for a combination of very different reasons, in which
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push and pull, as well as psychological and social, or political and economic
factors can play a part (cf. Richmond, 1994: 67–70). Furthermore, children of
immigrants who are born in the new country are not there voluntarily. Kymlicka
(1995: 215–16) avoids the problem by stating that ‘we must strenuously work to
ensure that the children integrate into mainstream’.
4 As Miller (2002: 187) remarks, in this context it is also interesting to note that
rights relating to minority groups as defined in ‘the Declaration on the Rights of
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities,
adopted by the General Assembly of the UN in 1992 as a further supplement to
the original Declaration of Human Rights, . . . turn out to be amplifications of
rights already ascribed to individuals in the Universal Declaration – for instance
the right to participate in political decision-making, the right to free association,
and so forth. All that the new Declaration is doing here is underlining the point
that people should not be deprived of such rights because they belong to a
minority group.’
5 Specifically, it concerns the Islamic festivals of Sugar and Sacrifice (each one
day); the Jewish New Year (2 days), Yom Kippur (1day), Feast of the Taber-
nacles (4 days), Shemini Atseret (last 2 days), Lesser Day of Atonement (1day),
Purim (1day), Passover (4 days), and Pentecost (2 days) in the Jewish faith;
Easter Monday, Ascension Day, and Whitsun in the orthodox Christian faith, for
the years when this does not coincide with the Catholic holy days
6 Cf. Article 9 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which ‘provides
that everyone has a right to freedom of religion, including the right to manifest
this religion in practice and observance’, and Article 27 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which says that members of minority
groups ‘shall not be denied the right . . . to profess and practice their own religion’.
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